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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) provides us
with the capability of collecting network traffic information
and managing networks proactively. Therefore, SDN facilitates
the promotion of more robust and secure networks. Recently,
several Machine Learning (ML)/Deep Learning (DL) intrusion
detection approaches have been proposed to secure SDN
networks. Currently, most of the proposed ML/DL intrusion
detection approaches are based on supervised learning approach
that required labelled and well-balanced datasets for training.
However, this is time intensive and require significant human
expertise to curate these datasets. These approaches cannot deal
well with imbalanced and unlabeled datasets. In this paper,
we propose a hybrid unsupervised DL approach using the
stack autoencoder and One-class Support Vector Machine (SAE-
1SVM) for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack detection.
The experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can
achieve an average accuracy of 99.35% with a small set of flow
features. The SAE-1SVM shows that it can reduce the processing
time significantly while maintaining a high detection rate. In
summary, the SAE-1SVM can work well with imbalanced and
unlabeled datasets and yield a high detection accuracy.
Index Terms—SDN, software-defined networking, network
intrusion detection, autoencoder, one-class SVM, DDoS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In SDN architecture, control and data planes are separated
from each other. The logically centralized control plane
provides a global network overview that can help to secure the
network efficiently. Network attacks (i.e., Port Scan, DDoS,
Man-in-the-Middle) can now be detected and mitigated in
a real time manner. DDoS attacks have existed for a long
time and are becoming more and more complex and directly
threaten the network’s service availability. These attacks are
relatively easy to perform, hard to defend against, and the
attacker is rarely traced back because of the distributed nature
of DDoS attacks. The attacker launches a DDoS attack using
a botnet-group of zombies-to generate a vast amount of traffic
against a victim’s web server. Zombies or computers that are
part of a botnet are usually recruited through the use of worms,
Trojan horses or back doors. Defending against DDoS attacks
is a challenging issue, and in order to do so, we have to first
detect these attacks. There are several methods for detecting
DDoS attacks like statistics-based method [1], clustering
method [2]. DDoS attacks can be mitigated by some defense
mechanisms like a firewall or load balancing. However, these
defense mechanisms have their own limitations and efficient.
Despite all the effort to tackle these attacks, DDoS attack
strategies are constantly evolving, so it is tough to detect
and mitigate against sophisticated variants of one of the most
common attacks. With the development of new DDoS attacks,
the statistic-based method and the clustering method cannot
perform well enough, so ML/DL approaches are becoming
more and more popular and eficient in detecting these kinds
of attacks. Several works [3]–[6] have been carried out to
tackle DDoS attacks in SDNs. Most of these works employ
supervised learning based approach. This approach requires
balanced and labelled datasets for training. However, these
datasets are not always available for researchers, and they
are especially rare in the context of SDN. Unlike supervised
learning, the unsupervised learning approach does not need
label information for the data and can address the imbalanced
classification problems. One-class Support Vector Machine
(OC-SVM) has for a long time been one of the most effective
anomaly detection methods and is widely adopted in both
research and industrial applications. However, the biggest
issues for OC-SVM is the capability to operate with large
and high-dimensional datasets due to inefficient features and
optimization complexity. As a result, the OC-SVM may not be
desirable in big data and high-dimensional anomaly detection
applications. Besides, Autoencoder recently emerges as an
effective intrusion detection approach in different fields [7]–
[9]. In these researches, a reconstruction error is used to detect
anomalies. In this paper, we propose an unsupervised hybrid
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approach combining Stack Autoencoder with OC-SVM (SAE-
1SVM) for DDoS attack detection in the SDN.
B. Contribution
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We introduce an unsupervised DDoS attack detection
approach in the SDN paradigm using the SAE-1SVM.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to use the SAE-1SVM for DDoS attack detection
in the SDN environment. In our work, the Stack
Autoencoder learns the patterns of legitimate traffic and
also compresses input data into a lower dimension. This
lower-dimensional and higher-level data is now more
suitable for the OC-SVM to process.
• Our SAE-1SVM approach yields a detection rate of
99.35% using a minimum number of features compared
to other state-of-the-art approaches.
• We also evaluate the computational overhead of the SAE-
1SVM. The result shows that our approach has significant
potential for real-time intrusion detection.
This paper is organized as follow. In Section II, we
introduce some related work. Section III describes our
proposed hybrid approach for DDoS attack detection, the
CICIDS20127 dataset and evaluation metrics. Section IV
shows the performance evaluation of our approach. Finally,
conclusions and future work are discussed in section V.
II. RELATED WORK
SDN-based IDSs have been extensively researched recently.
One of the earliest approaches for DDoS attack detection
in the SDN was proposed in [10]. Braga et al. presented a
lightweight approach using a Self Organizing Map (SOM)
to detect DDoS attacks in the SDN. This approach based
on six traffic flow features (Average of Packets per flow,
Average of Bytes per flow, Average of Duration per flow,
Percentage of Pair-flows, Growth of Single-flows, Growth of
Different Ports) gives a quite high detection accuracy. Nam
et al. [11] proposed an approach combining SOM and K-
Nearest Neighbors to detect several kinds of DDoS attacks
in SDN. This approach can reduce computational overheads
while maintaining a suitable ACC of 98.24%.
Recently, DL has developed as an important research trend
in the field of intrusion detection. Tang et al. [12] proposed a
DL approach for intrusion detection. They achieved a quite
promising accuracy of 75.75% using a limited number of
flow features. Yin et al. [13] proposed a DL approach using
recurrent neural networks for detection intrusion. They got an
accuracy of 83.28% with their experiments on the NSL-KDD
dataset. Fu et al. [14] proposed an IDS using Long short term
memory RNN (LSTM-RNN). They achieved an accuracy of
97.52% with the NSL-KDD dataset. An autoencoder (AE) -
a form of Artificial Neural Network - is extensively exploited
by many researchers for anomaly detection in SDNs. Zhang
et al. [15] proposed a method combining Sparse Autoencoder
and Xgboost algorithms to deal with a high-dimensional and
unlabelled dataset. They achieved an F1-measure of 91.97%,
but their precision is still quite low compared to other state-
of-the-art approaches. In [5], the authors proposed a DL based
approach using a stacked autoencoder (SAE) for detecting
DDoS attacks in the SDN. A non-symmetric deep AE and
Random Forest algorithm are combined to detect DDoS
attacks in [6]. The authors claim that they can obtain a good
classification result whilst significantly reducing the training
time.
These proposed methods can detect DDoS attacks with
quite high accuracy, but they only support limited types of
DDoS attacks and are all supervised learning approaches.
From the above approaches, a DDoS detection system which
is lightweight and unsupervised is now necessary.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first introduce the SAE-1SVM
architecture. Secondly, we describe the CICIDS2017 dataset
used in our research. Finally, we explain all the metrics used
to evaluate the performance of our proposed approach.
A. SAE-1SVM for DDoS Attack Detection
An AE consists of one input layer, one or more hidden
layers and one output layer. The input and output layers
always have the same sizes. A general structure for an AE
is shown in Fig. 1. The AE has two phases which are
encoding and decoding. For encoding process, input data x
is compressed into a low-dimensional representation h and
then the decoder reconstructs the input based on the low-
dimensional representation:
h = f(Wx+ b), (1)
y = f(W′h+ b′), (2)
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Fig. 1. A General Structure of an AE
where f(·) is a non-linearity activation function, W and W′
are hidden weight matrices, b and b′ are biases and y is the
output vector.
The main goal of training the AE is to minimize the
difference between the input x and output y. Therefore, a
MSE loss function is used as follows:
L(x,y) = ‖x− y‖
2
2
. (3)
In order to learn feature representations of input data, AEs
are stacked successively to form a deep AE (SAE). The
learned feature representations will be used as inputs for other
classifiers.
The OC-SVM [16] is an unsupervised approach for
classification. The OC-SVM tries to learn a hyperplane that
best separates all the data points from the origin:
f(x) = wTφ(x)− ρ, (4)
where φ(·) is a feature projection function that maps an input
vector x into a higher dimensional feature space, w is a
decision hyperplane normal vector which is perpendicular to
the hyperplane, and ρ is an intercept term. We can obtain w
and ρ by solving an objective function:
min
ω,ξ,ρ
1
2
‖w‖
2
+
1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi − ρ, (5)
subject to: wTφ(xi) ≥ ρ− ξi, ξi > 0,
where the meta-parameter ν ∈ (0, 1] determines the upper
bound on the fraction of outliers and the lower bound on the
number of training samples used as support vectors, and ξi
are non-zero slack variables for penalizing the outliers.
By using Lagrangian techniques and a kernel function for
the dot-product calculations, the decision function becomes:
f(x) =
n∑
i
αik(xi,x)− ρ, (6)
where αi is a Lagrange multiplier, and k(xi,x) = φ(xi)
Tφx
is a kernel function. A Radial Basic Function (RBF) kernel is
employed in our experiment:
k(xi,x) = e
−γ‖xi−x‖
2
, γ > 0. (7)
In this paper, we propose a hybrid approach combining
SAE with OC-SVM for DDoS attack detection. Fig. 2 gives
a general structure of the proposed SAE-1SVM. The SAE-
1SVM is trained with legitimate traffic traces. At first, the
legitimate traffic traces are trained with the SAE to extract the
low-dimensional representation, and then the low-dimensional
representation is trained with OC-SVM for DDoS attack
classification. Because the SAE-1SVM is trained with the
legitimate traffic only, the anomaly traffic will be considered
as outliers which can be easily detected.
B. CICIDS2017 Dataset
As mentioned in [17], most of the current network dataset
is out-of-date and not reliable enough, so the CICIDS2017
dataset was proposed as a new benchmark dataset. The
CICIDS2017 dataset is claimed to be most up-to-date with
all common attacks and real-world traffic. This dataset covers
seven types of common attack families (i.e., Brute Force
Attack, Heatbleed Attack, Botnet, DoS Attack, DDoS Attack,
Web Attack, and Infiltration Attack). This dataset is divided
into seven small datasets with different attack scenarios. All of
these datasets are labeled and saved in CSV format. Each flow
sample in the CICIDS2017 dataset contains 80 flow features
which are defined and explained in detail in [18].
In this paper, we choose the Wednesday dataset focusing on
DoS, Heartblead, Slowloris, Slowhttptest, Hulk, GoldenEye,
and DDoS attacks. These types of attacks are on the
rise and are major threats to the SDN architecture. The
Wednesday dataset contains 439,683 legitimate traffic and
251,723 anomaly traffic samples.
Since we just focus on the SDN-related flow feature, we
extract a subset of 13 SDN-related features out of 80 features
of this dataset for our research. Details of these features can
be seen in Table. I.
TABLE I
THE CICIDS2017’S FEATURE DESCRIPTION
Feature Name Description
Source Port Source port of the flow
Destination Port Destination port of the flow
Protocol Protocol type of the flow
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in microseconds
Total Fwd Packets Total packets in the forward direction
Total Length of Fwd
Packets
Total size of packet in forward direction
Fwd Packet Length Mean Standard deviation size of packet in forward
direction
Flow Bytes/s Number of flow bytes per second
Flow Packet/s Number of flow packets per second
Flow IAT Mean Mean time between two packets sent in the
forward direction
Flow IAT Std Standard deviation time between two
packets sent in the forward direction
Fwd Packets/s Number of forward packets per second
Subflow Fwd Bytes The average number of packets in a sub flow
in the forward direction
Samples in this dataset are normalized into the range of
[0-1] by Min-Max scaling. Its mathematical equation is given
as:
x
′
=
x−min(x)
max(x)−min(x)
, (8)
where x
′
is the normalized value, and x is the original value.
C. Evaluation Metrics
The performance and effectiveness of the NIDS are
evaluated by several metrics as follows:
• True Positive (TP): the number of anomaly records
correctly classified.
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Fig. 2. SAE-1SVM System Detail
• True Negative (TN): the number of normal records
correctly classified.
• False Positive (FP): the number of normal records
incorrectly classified.
• False Negative (FN): the number of anomaly record
incorrectly classified.
For the evaluation purpose, Accuracy (ACC), Precision (P),
Recall (R) and F1-measure (F1) metrics are applied. These
metrics are calculated as follows:
• Accuracy (ACC): shows the percentage of true detection
over total traffic trace:
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
× 100%. (9)
• Precision (P): shows how many intrusions predicted by a
NIDS are actual intrusions. The higher P then the lower
false alarm is:
P =
TP
TP + FP
× 100%. (10)
• Recall (R): shows the percentage of predicted intrusions
versus all intrusions presented. We want a high R value:
R =
TP
TP + FN
× 100%. (11)
• F1-measure (F1): gives a better measure of the accuracy
of a NIDS by considering both the precision (P) and the
recall (R). We also aim for a high F value:
F1 =
2
1
P
+ 1
R
× 100%. (12)
IV. DETECTION PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
In our experiment, the SAE architecture is implemented
with all hyper-parameters given in Table II. Details about the
number of neurons of each network architecture used in this
experiment are shown in Table III. For the OC-SVM model,
the parameters ν and γ are chosen from the range {10−10,
10−9,...,100}. After the optimizing process, the parameters in
(5) ν = 10−2 and γ = 10−2 are chosen for the experiment.
TABLE II
THE SAE HYPER-PARAMETERS
Variable Parameters
Activation Function Tanh
Loss Function Mean Squared Error
Learning Rate 0.001
Batch Size 10
Epoch 1000
TABLE III
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE DETAILS
Architecture Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
AE 13 2 13
SAE 1 13 6,2,6 13
SAE 2 13 10,8,6,4,2,4,6,8,10 13
B. DDoS Attack Detection with a Hard Threshold
The AE is commonly used to detect anomaly with the
idea that behaviors of attacks are different from those of
legitimate traffic. Therefore, the AE will be trained only with
the legitimate traffic and then it tries to reconstruct them
with the highest ACC. The anomaly traffic is not used for
training, so the AE cannot reconstruct them correctly. We
can detect anomaly traffic based on this difference. In this
section, we analyze the effect of network architecture on the
reconstruction performance.
We compare the reconstruction ACC of the AE, SAE 1,
and SAE 2 in Table IV. As we can see, the SAE 2 yields the
best reconstruction ACC at 98.6%. The AE gives a quite low
reconstruction ACC at 85%. With just one hidden layer, we
cannot learn good feature representations, so the reconstructed
input is just a lossy version of the original inputs. It shows
that a deeper SAE can learn feature representations better and
then reconstructs the inputs with a higher ACC. Therefore,
the SAE 2 will be chosen for further experiments.
TABLE IV
RECONSTRUCTION ACC COMPARISON
Architecture Reconstruction ACC (%)
AE 85
SAE 1 96
SAE 2 98.6
As in [7], [8], and [9], we also employ the reconstruction
error to detect anomalies. The SAE 2 is trained to minimize
the reconstruction error, so the error rate should be quite
small with the legitimate input traffic. If any anomaly traffic
is fed into the SAE 2, the SAE 2 could not recognize it and
reconstruct it correctly. In this case, the reconstruction error is
higher than normal, and so we can detect the network attack.
In Table V, we compare the performance of different
threshold values in terms of ACC, P, R, and F1. As we
can see, with a higher threshold, we get a higher detection
ACC. However, the other evaluation metrics drop dramatically
with high threshold values. The reason for this trend is that
more legitimate traffic is classified correctly with a higher
threshold, but we also misclassify anomaly traffic. Even with
a small threshold of 0.01, the detection P is still worst. If
we set a high hard threshold, the false positive rate will
increase significantly, and our network will become vulnerable
to attacks. If we set a low hard threshold, the false alarm rate
will increase and so the NIDS can block the legitimate traffic.
TABLE V
ACCURACY METRICS FOR DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS
Threshold ACC (%) P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
0.01 54.9 21 85 33.67
0.03 55.3 13.9 4.3 6.5
0.05 58.2 1.7 0.26 0.45
The AE approach with a hard threshold for anomaly
detection works quite well in [7], [8], and [9] but it does
not perform well in our experiments. This phenomenon can
be attributed to the complexity of DDoS attacks in the
CICIDS2017 dataset. Some DDoS attacks in this dataset try
to mimic behaviours of legitimate traffic, so the reconstruction
error rate of both legitimate and anomaly traffic quite close to
each other. As a result, they are hard to detect. As seen in this
section, the hard threshold approach is not good and efficient
enough for DDoS attack detection, so we will consider another
approach in the next section.
C. DDoS Attack Detection with the SAE-1SVM
In this section, we analyze the DDoS attack detection
performance of the SAE-1SVM. The general architecture
of the SAE-1SVM has been described in Fig. 2. In this
experiment, we employ the SAE 2 architecture from the
previous experiment for feature representation learning. To
begin with, we present the detection performance of the
SAE-1SVM in term of ACC, P, R, and F1. We compare
the performance of SAE-1SVM with classical OC-SVM. We
also compare the SAE-1SVM with a DL algorithm combined
Convolution Neural Network (CNN) and LSTM proposed
in [19]. This work also uses the CICIDS2017 dataset for
performance evaluation.
The overall detection performance comparison is depicted
in Table VI. According to the experimental results shown
in Table VI, we can see that the SAE-1SVM outperforms
the OC-SVM in all of the evaluation metrics. Specifically,
the SAE-1SVM achieves a much higher P than the OC-
SVM. The SAE-1SVM also achieves better results than
the CNN+LSTM algorithm. The main reason for this high
performance is that the OC-SVM in the SAE-1SVM is
trained with the low dimensional representation. The low
dimensional representation helps the OC-SVM characterize
the network traffic better, so the detection ACC can be
improved significantly.
TABLE VI
THE EVALUATION METRIC COMPARISON
Algorithm ACC (%) P (%) R (%) F1 (%)
OC-SVM 98 96.26 98.21 97.22
CNN+LSTM [19] 98.87 98.89 98.83 98.86
SAE-1SVM 99.35 99.97 98.28 99.11
The computational time is an important factor in evaluating
the performance of a classifier. Reducing the computational
time is also very important. The training and testing times
of each algorithm are presented in Table VII. As we can
see, the SAE-1SVM consumes significantly less time than
OC-SVM in both training and testing processes. The SAE-
1SVM is 27 and 6 times faster than the OC-SVM in training
and testing respectively. The OC-SVM module in the SAE-
1SVM now only processes 2-dimensional inputs compared
to 13-dimensional inputs in the original OC-SVM, so the
processing time has been reduced significantly. In the SAE-
1SVM, the OC-SVM processes more representative but lower-
dimensional inputs. Therefore, the SAE-1SVM has excellent
potential for real-time NIDS.
TABLE VII
THE TRAINING AND TESTING TIME COMPARISON
Algorithm Traing Time (s) Testing Time (s)
OC-SVM 5110 141
SAE-1SVM 189 26
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a hybrid unsupervised DL
approach for DDoS attack detection. The above results show
that our proposed approach has a strong potential in detecting
DDoS attacks using limited flow features. The experimental
results also show that our SAE-1SVM can deal really well
with imbalanced and unlabeled datasets. Although the final
results have a quite high false positive rate, the SAE-1SVM
can be improved in several ways. Several DL approaches can
be applied to the SAE to improve generalizing capability. We
can also optimize the OC-SVM by a grid search algorithm.
In future research, we will deploy our proposed approach in
a real SDN testbed for more detail analysis. Detecting other
kinds of network attacks will also be considered in future
research.
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